Securing Ukraine: Designing a Credible Air Deterrent After a Ceasefire
As diplomatic efforts toward a Russia-Ukraine ceasefire gain momentum, Western policymakers face a critical strategic question: how to ensure any peace agreement actually holds. Military experts warn that history suggests Russia treats ceasefires not as steps toward peace, but as opportunities to rearm and resume pressure through alternative means.
Retired Air Force Lieutenant General David A. Deptula and Naval War College Research Fellow Jahara Matisek argue that the key to a durable peace lies in constructing a robust airpower architecture capable of detecting, intercepting, and deterring Russian violations within minutes. Their solution: an Allied Air Command for Ukraine (AAC-U)—a multinational, integrated command structure that would unify Ukrainian fighters, allied aircraft, ground-based air defenses, and intelligence assets under unified control.
“Deterrence demands coherence, not a collection of stand-alone contributions,” the experts contend. Currently, Ukraine’s security assistance remains fragmented: F-16s from multiple European countries, Patriot systems from the U.S. and Germany, and various air defense platforms operate without unified command and control. This strategic gap leaves Ukraine vulnerable to Russian probing and testing of response times.
The proposed AAC-U would operate as an EU construct—not NATO-affiliated—to avoid Russian propaganda claims about NATO expansion. It would function similarly to existing Combined Air Operations Centers managing Baltic Air Policing missions. The command would integrate sensors, shooters, and decision-makers across multinational forces, requiring shared data links, common operating pictures, and intelligence-sharing that transcends national boundaries.
Crucially, the AAC-U must prioritize “automaticity.” This means establishing three core capabilities: persistent, day-and-night fighter coverage with 8-minute response times; fully integrated ground-based air defenses linked directly to fighter aircraft generating firing solutions within seconds; and flexible rules of engagement enabling immediate intercept or kinetic engagement once thresholds are crossed.
Russia’s historical pattern—from Georgia to Crimea to Syria—demonstrates it exploits diplomatic pauses to rebuild military capacity. Post-ceasefire, Moscow will likely intensify stand-off strikes, long-range cruise missiles, drone operations, and electronic warfare saturation while probing NATO airspace and testing allied resolve.
Simultaneously, Ukraine must pursue a dual-track approach: deploying fighter jets rapidly for immediate air defense while building a mixed-fleet model combining F-16s, Rafales, Gripens, and legacy Soviet aircraft. Western partners should invest comprehensively in maintenance, logistics, weapons integration, training pipelines, and dispersed basing infrastructure.
The authors emphasize that airpower alone cannot guarantee peace, but without it, no ceasefire agreement will survive inevitable Russian violations. A credible deterrent architecture operating at the speed of Russian decision-making is essential for sustainable security.
Source ID: SRCE-2025-1764864286225-1151