US-India Munitions Partnership: Stockpiles, Not Drones, Win Wars
Recent wars have exposed a hard truth often overlooked in defense discussions: drones and advanced weapons systems are only as effective as the ammunition that sustains them. The Ukraine conflict starkly illustrated this reality. In early 2022, the US produced approximately 14,000 155mm artillery shells monthly—while Ukraine expended roughly 28,000 daily. This mismatch prompted aggressive interventions. By October 2024, US production reached 40,000 shells per month, with plans to hit 100,000 by mid-2026. Yet even this dramatic surge falls short of actual wartime consumption rates.
India faces similar vulnerabilities. A 2017 audit revealed that 40 percent of ammunition types in India’s inventory would sustain only 10 days of intense combat—catastrophic in a potential two-front scenario against Pakistan and China. This finding spurred emergency procurement, private sector liberalization, and indigenous production initiatives, though the ambitious goal of 100 percent domestic ammunition self-sufficiency by 2025 remains unmet.
The deeper crisis lies not in shell casings but in what fills them: energetics. These hazardous materials—explosives like TNT and RDX, along with nitrocellulose-based propellants—are produced in dangerously limited quantities by both nations. The US produces zero TNT domestically, importing nearly all supplies from Poland, Turkey, India, and South Korea. India’s propellant and explosive output similarly falls short of military requirements.
Meanwhile, China has quietly monopolized global energetics markets. It dominates nitrocellulose production, controls CL-20 (the world’s most powerful non-nuclear explosive), and supplies 32 percent of global antimony—critical for ammunition hardening. In 2024, China weaponized these advantages through export restrictions on antimony and other military materials, mirroring its earlier rare earth leverage.
This vulnerability demands urgent action. Washington and New Delhi should pursue three strategic initiatives. First, jointly invest in energetic material production, leveraging India’s raw materials and US technical expertise. Second, position India as a surge capacity hub for high-volume ammunition production. Third, accept that peacetime redundancy—maintained idle production lines and strategic stockpiles—represents security, not inefficiency.
The path forward requires supply chain transparency, strategic planning, and shared commitment. Military sovereignty demands the ability to sustain fire independently. The US-India partnership offers a unique opportunity to build that resilience while reducing adversarial dependencies. When the next conflict arrives, victory will belong not to those with the finest technology, but to those capable of loading the next shell.
Source ID: SRCE-2025-1764102510227-924