Germany Considers Alternatives as FCAS Fighter Program Faces Uncertainty

Germany’s recently appointed Air Force chief has opened the door to pursuing alternative combat aircraft programs if the multinational Future Combat Air System continues struggling with delays and political tensions, marking a significant shift in Berlin’s defense procurement strategy.

Lieutenant General Holger Neumann told Der Spiegel that while Germany remains committed to developing advanced air combat capabilities, the country’s focus is on building a networked force architecture rather than remaining wedded to any single platform. This pragmatic approach reflects growing frustration with the FCAS program, which has been plagued by industrial workshare disputes and diverging national requirements since its inception.

“Decisive is the networking with unmanned systems and new types of sensors in a so-called combat cloud,” Neumann stated, emphasizing that this digital backbone will proceed regardless of the fate of the New Generation Fighter, the program’s most politically contentious element.

FCAS was conceived as a “system of systems” built on three main pillars: the New Generation Fighter crewed aircraft led by Dassault Aviation with Airbus as Germany and Spain’s partner; a family of remote carrier drones led by Airbus, MBDA, and Satnus; and the combat cloud led by Airbus Germany with Thales and Indra. The program represents Europe’s most ambitious defense collaboration, intended to replace Rafale and Eurofighter fleets from the 2040s onward.

However, the NGF has become a flashpoint for Franco-German tensions, with disagreements over industrial leadership, intellectual property rights, and operational requirements threatening the entire initiative. France and Germany are now actively reassessing whether to scale back or cancel the joint fighter entirely, potentially replacing it with national programs or alternative partnerships.

Neumann’s comments suggest Germany is preparing contingency plans. He pointed to the UK-Italy-Japan Global Combat Air Programme as one potential alternative, signaling Berlin’s willingness to explore new cooperation formats beyond the traditional Franco-German axis that has dominated European defense collaboration for decades.

Germany’s incoming F-35A Lightning II fleet, expected to arrive in 2026, will fulfill NATO nuclear-sharing commitments but won’t meet all of Berlin’s long-term air combat requirements. The Luftwaffe chief made clear that Germany seeks a comprehensive sixth-generation capability encompassing advanced sensors, loyal wingman drones, and next-generation weapons—a vision that could be realized through multiple procurement paths rather than a single program.

Neumann also highlighted Germany’s plans to modernize the Taurus cruise missile and develop the next-generation Taurus Neo, while noting that interim capabilities like the Tomahawk could strengthen deterrence until European long-range systems mature.

According to Reuters sources, France and Germany have given FCAS manufacturers until mid-December 2025 to resolve the program’s fundamental challenges. This deadline creates urgency for Dassault, Airbus, and their partners to find compromises on workshare and program structure.

The situation reflects broader questions about Europe’s defense industrial strategy. Can major powers collaborate on cutting-edge military technology while protecting national interests and industrial capabilities? Or will competitive pressures and sovereignty concerns fragment Europe’s defense sector into smaller, potentially less capable national programs?

Neumann’s pragmatic stance—prioritizing capabilities over specific platforms and keeping alternative options open—may represent the most realistic approach for navigating these tensions. By ring-fencing the combat cloud and unmanned systems development, Germany ensures progress on critical technologies regardless of political outcomes on the crewed fighter.

As the December 2025 deadline approaches, the future of European combat aviation hangs in the balance, with implications extending far beyond defense procurement to the fundamental question of whether Europe can achieve strategic autonomy in critical military technologies.

Source ID: SRCE-2025-1764102495222-906